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kernel: enable AppArmor by default

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AppArmor only requires a few patches to the 3.2 and 3.4 kernels in order
to work properly (with the minor catch grsecurity -stable includes the
3.2 patches.) This adds them to the kernel builds by default, removes
features.apparmor (since it's always true) and makes it the default MAC
system.

Signed-off-by: Austin Seipp <aseipp@pobox.com>
This commit is contained in:
Austin Seipp 2014-05-07 17:59:29 -05:00
parent 3efdeef6a3
commit 92abc4c610
13 changed files with 2868 additions and 54 deletions
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7
nixos/modules/security/apparmor.nix
View file

@ -23,13 +23,6 @@ in
};
config = mkIf cfg.enable {
assertions =
[ { assertion = config.boot.kernelPackages.kernel.features ? apparmor
&& config.boot.kernelPackages.kernel.features.apparmor;
message = "Your selected kernel does not have AppArmor support";
}
];
environment.systemPackages = [ pkgs.apparmor ];
systemd.services.apparmor = {
wantedBy = [ "local-fs.target" ];

4
nixos/modules/security/grsecurity.nix
View file

@ -73,8 +73,6 @@ let
restrictLinks = optionalString cfg.testing
"GRKERNSEC_LINK n";
in ''
SECURITY_APPARMOR y
DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR y
GRKERNSEC y
${grsecMainConfig}
@ -434,7 +432,7 @@ in
chmod -R 0600 /etc/grsec
'';
# Enable apparmor support, gradm udev rules, and utilities
# Enable AppArmor, gradm udev rules, and utilities
security.apparmor.enable = true;
boot.kernelPackages = grsecPackage;
services.udev.packages = [ pkgs.gradm ];

553
pkgs/os-specific/linux/kernel/apparmor-patches/3.2/0001-AppArmor-compatibility-patch-for-v5-network-controll.patch Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,553 @@
From 125fccb600288968aa3395883c0a394c47176fcd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Aug 2011 22:02:39 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 1/3] AppArmor: compatibility patch for v5 network controll
Add compatibility for v5 network rules.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
---
include/linux/lsm_audit.h | 4 +
security/apparmor/Makefile | 19 +++-
security/apparmor/include/net.h | 40 +++++++++
security/apparmor/include/policy.h | 3 +
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 112 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/apparmor/net.c | 170 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/apparmor/policy.c | 1 +
security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c | 48 +++++++++-
8 files changed, 394 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 security/apparmor/include/net.h
create mode 100644 security/apparmor/net.c
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_audit.h b/include/linux/lsm_audit.h
index 88e78de..c63979a 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_audit.h
@@ -124,6 +124,10 @@ struct common_audit_data {
u32 denied;
uid_t ouid;
} fs;
+ struct {
+ int type, protocol;
+ struct sock *sk;
+ } net;
};
} apparmor_audit_data;
#endif
diff --git a/security/apparmor/Makefile b/security/apparmor/Makefile
index 2dafe50..7cefef9 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/Makefile
+++ b/security/apparmor/Makefile
@@ -4,9 +4,9 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor.o
apparmor-y := apparmorfs.o audit.o capability.o context.o ipc.o lib.o match.o \
path.o domain.o policy.o policy_unpack.o procattr.o lsm.o \
- resource.o sid.o file.o
+ resource.o sid.o file.o net.o
-clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h
+clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h af_names.h
# Build a lower case string table of capability names
@@ -44,9 +44,24 @@ cmd_make-rlim = echo "static const char *rlim_names[] = {" > $@ ;\
sed -r -n "s/^\# ?define[ \t]+(RLIMIT_[A-Z0-9_]+).*/\1,/p" $< >> $@ ;\
echo "};" >> $@
+# Build a lower case string table of address family names.
+# Transform lines from
+# #define AF_INET 2 /* Internet IP Protocol */
+# to
+# [2] = "inet",
+quiet_cmd_make-af = GEN $@
+cmd_make-af = echo "static const char *address_family_names[] = {" > $@ ;\
+ sed $< >> $@ -r -n -e "/AF_MAX/d" -e "/AF_LOCAL/d" -e \
+ 's/^\#define[ \t]+AF_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+).*/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\
+ echo "};" >> $@
+
+
$(obj)/capability.o : $(obj)/capability_names.h
$(obj)/resource.o : $(obj)/rlim_names.h
+$(obj)/net.o : $(obj)/af_names.h
$(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/capability.h
$(call cmd,make-caps)
$(obj)/rlim_names.h : $(srctree)/include/asm-generic/resource.h
$(call cmd,make-rlim)
+$(obj)/af_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/socket.h
+ $(call cmd,make-af)
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/net.h b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3c7d599
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor network mediation definitions.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __AA_NET_H
+#define __AA_NET_H
+
+#include <net/sock.h>
+
+/* struct aa_net - network confinement data
+ * @allowed: basic network families permissions
+ * @audit_network: which network permissions to force audit
+ * @quiet_network: which network permissions to quiet rejects
+ */
+struct aa_net {
+ u16 allow[AF_MAX];
+ u16 audit[AF_MAX];
+ u16 quiet[AF_MAX];
+};
+
+extern int aa_net_perm(int op, struct aa_profile *profile, u16 family,
+ int type, int protocol, struct sock *sk);
+extern int aa_revalidate_sk(int op, struct sock *sk);
+
+static inline void aa_free_net_rules(struct aa_net *new)
+{
+ /* NOP */
+}
+
+#endif /* __AA_NET_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
index aeda5cf..6776929 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
#include "capability.h"
#include "domain.h"
#include "file.h"
+#include "net.h"
#include "resource.h"
extern const char *profile_mode_names[];
@@ -145,6 +146,7 @@ struct aa_namespace {
* @size: the memory consumed by this profiles rules
* @file: The set of rules governing basic file access and domain transitions
* @caps: capabilities for the profile
+ * @net: network controls for the profile
* @rlimits: rlimits for the profile
*
* The AppArmor profile contains the basic confinement data. Each profile
@@ -181,6 +183,7 @@ struct aa_profile {
struct aa_file_rules file;
struct aa_caps caps;
+ struct aa_net net;
struct aa_rlimit rlimits;
};
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 3783202..7459547 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
#include "include/context.h"
#include "include/file.h"
#include "include/ipc.h"
+#include "include/net.h"
#include "include/path.h"
#include "include/policy.h"
#include "include/procattr.h"
@@ -621,6 +622,104 @@ static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task,
return error;
}
+static int apparmor_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *profile;
+ int error = 0;
+
+ if (kern)
+ return 0;
+
+ profile = __aa_current_profile();
+ if (!unconfined(profile))
+ error = aa_net_perm(OP_CREATE, profile, family, type, protocol,
+ NULL);
+ return error;
+}
+
+static int apparmor_socket_bind(struct socket *sock,
+ struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
+{
+ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+
+ return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_BIND, sk);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
+ struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
+{
+ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+
+ return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_CONNECT, sk);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
+{
+ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+
+ return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_LISTEN, sk);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
+{
+ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+
+ return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_ACCEPT, sk);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock,
+ struct msghdr *msg, int size)
+{
+ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+
+ return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_SENDMSG, sk);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock,
+ struct msghdr *msg, int size, int flags)
+{
+ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+
+ return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_RECVMSG, sk);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
+{
+ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+
+ return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_GETSOCKNAME, sk);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
+{
+ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+
+ return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_GETPEERNAME, sk);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
+ int optname)
+{
+ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+
+ return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_GETSOCKOPT, sk);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
+ int optname)
+{
+ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+
+ return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_SETSOCKOPT, sk);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
+{
+ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+
+ return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_SOCK_SHUTDOWN, sk);
+}
+
static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = {
.name = "apparmor",
@@ -652,6 +751,19 @@ static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = {
.getprocattr = apparmor_getprocattr,
.setprocattr = apparmor_setprocattr,
+ .socket_create = apparmor_socket_create,
+ .socket_bind = apparmor_socket_bind,
+ .socket_connect = apparmor_socket_connect,
+ .socket_listen = apparmor_socket_listen,
+ .socket_accept = apparmor_socket_accept,
+ .socket_sendmsg = apparmor_socket_sendmsg,
+ .socket_recvmsg = apparmor_socket_recvmsg,
+ .socket_getsockname = apparmor_socket_getsockname,
+ .socket_getpeername = apparmor_socket_getpeername,
+ .socket_getsockopt = apparmor_socket_getsockopt,
+ .socket_setsockopt = apparmor_socket_setsockopt,
+ .socket_shutdown = apparmor_socket_shutdown,
+
.cred_alloc_blank = apparmor_cred_alloc_blank,
.cred_free = apparmor_cred_free,
.cred_prepare = apparmor_cred_prepare,
diff --git a/security/apparmor/net.c b/security/apparmor/net.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1765901
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/net.c
@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor network mediation
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#include "include/apparmor.h"
+#include "include/audit.h"
+#include "include/context.h"
+#include "include/net.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
+
+#include "af_names.h"
+
+static const char *sock_type_names[] = {
+ "unknown(0)",
+ "stream",
+ "dgram",
+ "raw",
+ "rdm",
+ "seqpacket",
+ "dccp",
+ "unknown(7)",
+ "unknown(8)",
+ "unknown(9)",
+ "packet",
+};
+
+/* audit callback for net specific fields */
+static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
+{
+ struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
+
+ audit_log_format(ab, " family=");
+ if (address_family_names[sa->u.net.family]) {
+ audit_log_string(ab, address_family_names[sa->u.net.family]);
+ } else {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " \"unknown(%d)\"", sa->u.net.family);
+ }
+
+ audit_log_format(ab, " sock_type=");
+ if (sock_type_names[sa->aad.net.type]) {
+ audit_log_string(ab, sock_type_names[sa->aad.net.type]);
+ } else {
+ audit_log_format(ab, "\"unknown(%d)\"", sa->aad.net.type);
+ }
+
+ audit_log_format(ab, " protocol=%d", sa->aad.net.protocol);
+}
+
+/**
+ * audit_net - audit network access
+ * @profile: profile being enforced (NOT NULL)
+ * @op: operation being checked
+ * @family: network family
+ * @type: network type
+ * @protocol: network protocol
+ * @sk: socket auditing is being applied to
+ * @error: error code for failure else 0
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 or sa->error else other errorcode on failure
+ */
+static int audit_net(struct aa_profile *profile, int op, u16 family, int type,
+ int protocol, struct sock *sk, int error)
+{
+ int audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
+ struct common_audit_data sa;
+ if (sk) {
+ COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NET);
+ } else {
+ COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE);
+ }
+ /* todo fill in socket addr info */
+
+ sa.aad.op = op,
+ sa.u.net.family = family;
+ sa.u.net.sk = sk;
+ sa.aad.net.type = type;
+ sa.aad.net.protocol = protocol;
+ sa.aad.error = error;
+
+ if (likely(!sa.aad.error)) {
+ u16 audit_mask = profile->net.audit[sa.u.net.family];
+ if (likely((AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL) &&
+ !(1 << sa.aad.net.type & audit_mask)))
+ return 0;
+ audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT;
+ } else {
+ u16 quiet_mask = profile->net.quiet[sa.u.net.family];
+ u16 kill_mask = 0;
+ u16 denied = (1 << sa.aad.net.type) & ~quiet_mask;
+
+ if (denied & kill_mask)
+ audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
+
+ if ((denied & quiet_mask) &&
+ AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_NOQUIET &&
+ AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL)
+ return COMPLAIN_MODE(profile) ? 0 : sa.aad.error;
+ }
+
+ return aa_audit(audit_type, profile, GFP_KERNEL, &sa, audit_cb);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_net_perm - very course network access check
+ * @op: operation being checked
+ * @profile: profile being enforced (NOT NULL)
+ * @family: network family
+ * @type: network type
+ * @protocol: network protocol
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 else error if permission denied
+ */
+int aa_net_perm(int op, struct aa_profile *profile, u16 family, int type,
+ int protocol, struct sock *sk)
+{
+ u16 family_mask;
+ int error;
+
+ if ((family < 0) || (family >= AF_MAX))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if ((type < 0) || (type >= SOCK_MAX))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* unix domain and netlink sockets are handled by ipc */
+ if (family == AF_UNIX || family == AF_NETLINK)
+ return 0;
+
+ family_mask = profile->net.allow[family];
+
+ error = (family_mask & (1 << type)) ? 0 : -EACCES;
+
+ return audit_net(profile, op, family, type, protocol, sk, error);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_revalidate_sk - Revalidate access to a sock
+ * @op: operation being checked
+ * @sk: sock being revalidated (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 else error if permission denied
+ */
+int aa_revalidate_sk(int op, struct sock *sk)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *profile;
+ int error = 0;
+
+ /* aa_revalidate_sk should not be called from interrupt context
+ * don't mediate these calls as they are not task related
+ */
+ if (in_interrupt())
+ return 0;
+
+ profile = __aa_current_profile();
+ if (!unconfined(profile))
+ error = aa_net_perm(op, profile, sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
+ sk->sk_protocol, sk);
+
+ return error;
+}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
index 4f0eade..4d5ce13 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
@@ -745,6 +745,7 @@ static void free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
aa_free_file_rules(&profile->file);
aa_free_cap_rules(&profile->caps);
+ aa_free_net_rules(&profile->net);
aa_free_rlimit_rules(&profile->rlimits);
aa_free_sid(profile->sid);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
index 741dd13..ee8043e 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
@@ -190,6 +190,19 @@ fail:
return 0;
}
+static bool unpack_u16(struct aa_ext *e, u16 *data, const char *name)
+{
+ if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_U16, name)) {
+ if (!inbounds(e, sizeof(u16)))
+ return 0;
+ if (data)
+ *data = le16_to_cpu(get_unaligned((u16 *) e->pos));
+ e->pos += sizeof(u16);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
static bool unpack_u32(struct aa_ext *e, u32 *data, const char *name)
{
if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_U32, name)) {
@@ -468,7 +481,8 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e)
{
struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
const char *name = NULL;
- int error = -EPROTO;
+ size_t size = 0;
+ int i, error = -EPROTO;
kernel_cap_t tmpcap;
u32 tmp;
@@ -559,6 +573,38 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e)
if (!unpack_rlimits(e, profile))
goto fail;
+ size = unpack_array(e, "net_allowed_af");
+ if (size) {
+
+ for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
+ /* discard extraneous rules that this kernel will
+ * never request
+ */
+ if (i >= AF_MAX) {
+ u16 tmp;
+ if (!unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL) ||
+ !unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL) ||
+ !unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL))
+ goto fail;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.allow[i], NULL))
+ goto fail;
+ if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.audit[i], NULL))
+ goto fail;
+ if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.quiet[i], NULL))
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_ARRAYEND, NULL))
+ goto fail;
+ /*
+ * allow unix domain and netlink sockets they are handled
+ * by IPC
+ */
+ }
+ profile->net.allow[AF_UNIX] = 0xffff;
+ profile->net.allow[AF_NETLINK] = 0xffff;
+
/* get file rules */
profile->file.dfa = unpack_dfa(e);
if (IS_ERR(profile->file.dfa)) {
--
1.7.9.5

391
pkgs/os-specific/linux/kernel/apparmor-patches/3.2/0002-AppArmor-compatibility-patch-for-v5-interface.patch Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,391 @@
From 004192fb5223c7b81a949e36a080a5da56132826 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Aug 2011 22:02:40 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 2/3] AppArmor: compatibility patch for v5 interface
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
---
security/apparmor/Kconfig | 9 +
security/apparmor/Makefile | 1 +
security/apparmor/apparmorfs-24.c | 287 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c | 18 +-
security/apparmor/include/apparmorfs.h | 6 +
5 files changed, 319 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 security/apparmor/apparmorfs-24.c
diff --git a/security/apparmor/Kconfig b/security/apparmor/Kconfig
index 9b9013b..51ebf96 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/Kconfig
+++ b/security/apparmor/Kconfig
@@ -29,3 +29,12 @@ config SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE
boot.
If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer 1.
+
+config SECURITY_APPARMOR_COMPAT_24
+ bool "Enable AppArmor 2.4 compatability"
+ depends on SECURITY_APPARMOR
+ default y
+ help
+ This option enables compatability with AppArmor 2.4. It is
+ recommended if compatability with older versions of AppArmor
+ is desired.
diff --git a/security/apparmor/Makefile b/security/apparmor/Makefile
index 7cefef9..0bb604b 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/Makefile
+++ b/security/apparmor/Makefile
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor.o
apparmor-y := apparmorfs.o audit.o capability.o context.o ipc.o lib.o match.o \
path.o domain.o policy.o policy_unpack.o procattr.o lsm.o \
resource.o sid.o file.o net.o
+apparmor-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_COMPAT_24) += apparmorfs-24.o
clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h af_names.h
diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs-24.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs-24.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dc8c744
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs-24.c
@@ -0,0 +1,287 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor /sys/kernel/secrutiy/apparmor interface functions
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2010 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ *
+ *
+ * This file contain functions providing an interface for <= AppArmor 2.4
+ * compatibility. It is dependent on CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_COMPAT_24
+ * being set (see Makefile).
+ */
+
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/seq_file.h>
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/namei.h>
+
+#include "include/apparmor.h"
+#include "include/audit.h"
+#include "include/context.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
+
+
+/* apparmor/matching */
+static ssize_t aa_matching_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
+ size_t size, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ const char matching[] = "pattern=aadfa audit perms=crwxamlk/ "
+ "user::other";
+
+ return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, size, ppos, matching,
+ sizeof(matching) - 1);
+}
+
+const struct file_operations aa_fs_matching_fops = {
+ .read = aa_matching_read,
+};
+
+/* apparmor/features */
+static ssize_t aa_features_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
+ size_t size, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ const char features[] = "file=3.1 capability=2.0 network=1.0 "
+ "change_hat=1.5 change_profile=1.1 " "aanamespaces=1.1 rlimit=1.1";
+
+ return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, size, ppos, features,
+ sizeof(features) - 1);
+}
+
+const struct file_operations aa_fs_features_fops = {
+ .read = aa_features_read,
+};
+
+/**
+ * __next_namespace - find the next namespace to list
+ * @root: root namespace to stop search at (NOT NULL)
+ * @ns: current ns position (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Find the next namespace from @ns under @root and handle all locking needed
+ * while switching current namespace.
+ *
+ * Returns: next namespace or NULL if at last namespace under @root
+ * NOTE: will not unlock root->lock
+ */
+static struct aa_namespace *__next_namespace(struct aa_namespace *root,
+ struct aa_namespace *ns)
+{
+ struct aa_namespace *parent;
+
+ /* is next namespace a child */
+ if (!list_empty(&ns->sub_ns)) {
+ struct aa_namespace *next;
+ next = list_first_entry(&ns->sub_ns, typeof(*ns), base.list);
+ read_lock(&next->lock);
+ return next;
+ }
+
+ /* check if the next ns is a sibling, parent, gp, .. */
+ parent = ns->parent;
+ while (parent) {
+ read_unlock(&ns->lock);
+ list_for_each_entry_continue(ns, &parent->sub_ns, base.list) {
+ read_lock(&ns->lock);
+ return ns;
+ }
+ if (parent == root)
+ return NULL;
+ ns = parent;
+ parent = parent->parent;
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * __first_profile - find the first profile in a namespace
+ * @root: namespace that is root of profiles being displayed (NOT NULL)
+ * @ns: namespace to start in (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: unrefcounted profile or NULL if no profile
+ */
+static struct aa_profile *__first_profile(struct aa_namespace *root,
+ struct aa_namespace *ns)
+{
+ for ( ; ns; ns = __next_namespace(root, ns)) {
+ if (!list_empty(&ns->base.profiles))
+ return list_first_entry(&ns->base.profiles,
+ struct aa_profile, base.list);
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * __next_profile - step to the next profile in a profile tree
+ * @profile: current profile in tree (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Perform a depth first taversal on the profile tree in a namespace
+ *
+ * Returns: next profile or NULL if done
+ * Requires: profile->ns.lock to be held
+ */
+static struct aa_profile *__next_profile(struct aa_profile *p)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *parent;
+ struct aa_namespace *ns = p->ns;
+
+ /* is next profile a child */
+ if (!list_empty(&p->base.profiles))
+ return list_first_entry(&p->base.profiles, typeof(*p),
+ base.list);
+
+ /* is next profile a sibling, parent sibling, gp, subling, .. */
+ parent = p->parent;
+ while (parent) {
+ list_for_each_entry_continue(p, &parent->base.profiles,
+ base.list)
+ return p;
+ p = parent;
+ parent = parent->parent;
+ }
+
+ /* is next another profile in the namespace */
+ list_for_each_entry_continue(p, &ns->base.profiles, base.list)
+ return p;
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * next_profile - step to the next profile in where ever it may be
+ * @root: root namespace (NOT NULL)
+ * @profile: current profile (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: next profile or NULL if there isn't one
+ */
+static struct aa_profile *next_profile(struct aa_namespace *root,
+ struct aa_profile *profile)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *next = __next_profile(profile);
+ if (next)
+ return next;
+
+ /* finished all profiles in namespace move to next namespace */
+ return __first_profile(root, __next_namespace(root, profile->ns));
+}
+
+/**
+ * p_start - start a depth first traversal of profile tree
+ * @f: seq_file to fill
+ * @pos: current position
+ *
+ * Returns: first profile under current namespace or NULL if none found
+ *
+ * acquires first ns->lock
+ */
+static void *p_start(struct seq_file *f, loff_t *pos)
+ __acquires(root->lock)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
+ struct aa_namespace *root = aa_current_profile()->ns;
+ loff_t l = *pos;
+ f->private = aa_get_namespace(root);
+
+
+ /* find the first profile */
+ read_lock(&root->lock);
+ profile = __first_profile(root, root);
+
+ /* skip to position */
+ for (; profile && l > 0; l--)
+ profile = next_profile(root, profile);
+
+ return profile;
+}
+
+/**
+ * p_next - read the next profile entry
+ * @f: seq_file to fill
+ * @p: profile previously returned
+ * @pos: current position
+ *
+ * Returns: next profile after @p or NULL if none
+ *
+ * may acquire/release locks in namespace tree as necessary
+ */
+static void *p_next(struct seq_file *f, void *p, loff_t *pos)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *profile = p;
+ struct aa_namespace *root = f->private;
+ (*pos)++;
+
+ return next_profile(root, profile);
+}
+
+/**
+ * p_stop - stop depth first traversal
+ * @f: seq_file we are filling
+ * @p: the last profile writen
+ *
+ * Release all locking done by p_start/p_next on namespace tree
+ */
+static void p_stop(struct seq_file *f, void *p)
+ __releases(root->lock)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *profile = p;
+ struct aa_namespace *root = f->private, *ns;
+
+ if (profile) {
+ for (ns = profile->ns; ns && ns != root; ns = ns->parent)
+ read_unlock(&ns->lock);
+ }
+ read_unlock(&root->lock);
+ aa_put_namespace(root);
+}
+
+/**
+ * seq_show_profile - show a profile entry
+ * @f: seq_file to file
+ * @p: current position (profile) (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: error on failure
+ */
+static int seq_show_profile(struct seq_file *f, void *p)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *profile = (struct aa_profile *)p;
+ struct aa_namespace *root = f->private;
+
+ if (profile->ns != root)
+ seq_printf(f, ":%s://", aa_ns_name(root, profile->ns));
+ seq_printf(f, "%s (%s)\n", profile->base.hname,
+ COMPLAIN_MODE(profile) ? "complain" : "enforce");
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct seq_operations aa_fs_profiles_op = {
+ .start = p_start,
+ .next = p_next,
+ .stop = p_stop,
+ .show = seq_show_profile,
+};
+
+static int profiles_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ return seq_open(file, &aa_fs_profiles_op);
+}
+
+static int profiles_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ return seq_release(inode, file);
+}
+
+const struct file_operations aa_fs_profiles_fops = {
+ .open = profiles_open,
+ .read = seq_read,
+ .llseek = seq_lseek,
+ .release = profiles_release,
+};
diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
index 69ddb47..867995c 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
@@ -187,7 +187,11 @@ void __init aa_destroy_aafs(void)
aafs_remove(".remove");
aafs_remove(".replace");
aafs_remove(".load");
-
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_COMPAT_24
+ aafs_remove("profiles");
+ aafs_remove("matching");
+ aafs_remove("features");
+#endif
securityfs_remove(aa_fs_dentry);
aa_fs_dentry = NULL;
}
@@ -218,7 +222,17 @@ static int __init aa_create_aafs(void)
aa_fs_dentry = NULL;
goto error;
}
-
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_COMPAT_24
+ error = aafs_create("matching", 0444, &aa_fs_matching_fops);
+ if (error)
+ goto error;
+ error = aafs_create("features", 0444, &aa_fs_features_fops);
+ if (error)
+ goto error;
+#endif
+ error = aafs_create("profiles", 0440, &aa_fs_profiles_fops);
+ if (error)
+ goto error;
error = aafs_create(".load", 0640, &aa_fs_profile_load);
if (error)
goto error;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/apparmorfs.h b/security/apparmor/include/apparmorfs.h
index cb1e93a..14f955c 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/apparmorfs.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/apparmorfs.h
@@ -17,4 +17,10 @@
extern void __init aa_destroy_aafs(void);
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_COMPAT_24
+extern const struct file_operations aa_fs_matching_fops;
+extern const struct file_operations aa_fs_features_fops;
+extern const struct file_operations aa_fs_profiles_fops;
+#endif
+
#endif /* __AA_APPARMORFS_H */
--
1.7.9.5

69
pkgs/os-specific/linux/kernel/apparmor-patches/3.2/0003-AppArmor-Allow-dfa-backward-compatibility-with-broke.patch Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
From e5d90918aa31f948ecec2f3c088567dbab30c90b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Aug 2011 22:02:41 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 3/3] AppArmor: Allow dfa backward compatibility with broken
userspace
The apparmor_parser when compiling policy could generate invalid dfas
that did not have sufficient padding to avoid invalid references, when
used by the kernel. The kernels check to verify the next/check table
size was broken meaning invalid dfas were being created by userspace
and not caught.
To remain compatible with old tools that are not fixed, pad the loaded
dfas next/check table. The dfa's themselves are valid except for the
high padding for potentially invalid transitions (high bounds error),
which have a maximimum is 256 entries. So just allocate an extra null filled
256 entries for the next/check tables. This will guarentee all bounds
are good and invalid transitions go to the null (0) state.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
---
security/apparmor/match.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 17 insertions(+)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/match.c b/security/apparmor/match.c
index 94de6b4..081491e 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/match.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/match.c
@@ -57,8 +57,17 @@ static struct table_header *unpack_table(char *blob, size_t bsize)
if (bsize < tsize)
goto out;
+ /* Pad table allocation for next/check by 256 entries to remain
+ * backwards compatible with old (buggy) tools and remain safe without
+ * run time checks
+ */
+ if (th.td_id == YYTD_ID_NXT || th.td_id == YYTD_ID_CHK)
+ tsize += 256 * th.td_flags;
+
table = kvmalloc(tsize);
if (table) {
+ /* ensure the pad is clear, else there will be errors */
+ memset(table, 0, tsize);
*table = th;
if (th.td_flags == YYTD_DATA8)
UNPACK_ARRAY(table->td_data, blob, th.td_lolen,
@@ -134,11 +143,19 @@ static int verify_dfa(struct aa_dfa *dfa, int flags)
goto out;
if (flags & DFA_FLAG_VERIFY_STATES) {
+ int warning = 0;
for (i = 0; i < state_count; i++) {
if (DEFAULT_TABLE(dfa)[i] >= state_count)
goto out;
/* TODO: do check that DEF state recursion terminates */
if (BASE_TABLE(dfa)[i] + 255 >= trans_count) {
+ if (warning)
+ continue;
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "AppArmor DFA next/check "
+ "upper bounds error fixed, upgrade "
+ "user space tools \n");
+ warning = 1;
+ } else if (BASE_TABLE(dfa)[i] >= trans_count) {
printk(KERN_ERR "AppArmor DFA next/check upper "
"bounds error\n");
goto out;
--
1.7.9.5

264
pkgs/os-specific/linux/kernel/apparmor-patches/3.4/0001-UBUNTU-SAUCE-AppArmor-Add-profile-introspection-file.patch Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,264 @@
From 8de755e4dfdbc40bfcaca848ae6b5aeaf0ede0e8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date: Thu, 22 Jul 2010 02:32:02 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 1/3] UBUNTU: SAUCE: AppArmor: Add profile introspection file
to interface
Add the dynamic profiles file to the interace, to allow load policy
introspection.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: Tim Gardner <tim.gardner@canonical.com>
---
security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c | 227 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 227 insertions(+)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
index 16c15ec..89bdc62 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
@@ -182,6 +182,232 @@ const struct file_operations aa_fs_seq_file_ops = {
.release = single_release,
};
+/**
+ * __next_namespace - find the next namespace to list
+ * @root: root namespace to stop search at (NOT NULL)
+ * @ns: current ns position (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Find the next namespace from @ns under @root and handle all locking needed
+ * while switching current namespace.
+ *
+ * Returns: next namespace or NULL if at last namespace under @root
+ * NOTE: will not unlock root->lock
+ */
+static struct aa_namespace *__next_namespace(struct aa_namespace *root,
+ struct aa_namespace *ns)
+{
+ struct aa_namespace *parent;
+
+ /* is next namespace a child */
+ if (!list_empty(&ns->sub_ns)) {
+ struct aa_namespace *next;
+ next = list_first_entry(&ns->sub_ns, typeof(*ns), base.list);
+ read_lock(&next->lock);
+ return next;
+ }
+
+ /* check if the next ns is a sibling, parent, gp, .. */
+ parent = ns->parent;
+ while (parent) {
+ read_unlock(&ns->lock);
+ list_for_each_entry_continue(ns, &parent->sub_ns, base.list) {
+ read_lock(&ns->lock);
+ return ns;
+ }
+ if (parent == root)
+ return NULL;
+ ns = parent;
+ parent = parent->parent;
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * __first_profile - find the first profile in a namespace
+ * @root: namespace that is root of profiles being displayed (NOT NULL)
+ * @ns: namespace to start in (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: unrefcounted profile or NULL if no profile
+ */
+static struct aa_profile *__first_profile(struct aa_namespace *root,
+ struct aa_namespace *ns)
+{
+ for ( ; ns; ns = __next_namespace(root, ns)) {
+ if (!list_empty(&ns->base.profiles))
+ return list_first_entry(&ns->base.profiles,
+ struct aa_profile, base.list);
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * __next_profile - step to the next profile in a profile tree
+ * @profile: current profile in tree (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Perform a depth first taversal on the profile tree in a namespace
+ *
+ * Returns: next profile or NULL if done
+ * Requires: profile->ns.lock to be held
+ */
+static struct aa_profile *__next_profile(struct aa_profile *p)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *parent;
+ struct aa_namespace *ns = p->ns;
+
+ /* is next profile a child */
+ if (!list_empty(&p->base.profiles))
+ return list_first_entry(&p->base.profiles, typeof(*p),
+ base.list);
+
+ /* is next profile a sibling, parent sibling, gp, subling, .. */
+ parent = p->parent;
+ while (parent) {
+ list_for_each_entry_continue(p, &parent->base.profiles,
+ base.list)
+ return p;
+ p = parent;
+ parent = parent->parent;
+ }
+
+ /* is next another profile in the namespace */
+ list_for_each_entry_continue(p, &ns->base.profiles, base.list)
+ return p;
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * next_profile - step to the next profile in where ever it may be
+ * @root: root namespace (NOT NULL)
+ * @profile: current profile (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: next profile or NULL if there isn't one
+ */
+static struct aa_profile *next_profile(struct aa_namespace *root,
+ struct aa_profile *profile)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *next = __next_profile(profile);
+ if (next)
+ return next;
+
+ /* finished all profiles in namespace move to next namespace */
+ return __first_profile(root, __next_namespace(root, profile->ns));
+}
+
+/**
+ * p_start - start a depth first traversal of profile tree
+ * @f: seq_file to fill
+ * @pos: current position
+ *
+ * Returns: first profile under current namespace or NULL if none found
+ *
+ * acquires first ns->lock
+ */
+static void *p_start(struct seq_file *f, loff_t *pos)
+ __acquires(root->lock)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
+ struct aa_namespace *root = aa_current_profile()->ns;
+ loff_t l = *pos;
+ f->private = aa_get_namespace(root);
+
+
+ /* find the first profile */
+ read_lock(&root->lock);
+ profile = __first_profile(root, root);
+
+ /* skip to position */
+ for (; profile && l > 0; l--)
+ profile = next_profile(root, profile);
+
+ return profile;
+}
+
+/**
+ * p_next - read the next profile entry
+ * @f: seq_file to fill
+ * @p: profile previously returned
+ * @pos: current position
+ *
+ * Returns: next profile after @p or NULL if none
+ *
+ * may acquire/release locks in namespace tree as necessary
+ */
+static void *p_next(struct seq_file *f, void *p, loff_t *pos)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *profile = p;
+ struct aa_namespace *root = f->private;
+ (*pos)++;
+
+ return next_profile(root, profile);
+}
+
+/**
+ * p_stop - stop depth first traversal
+ * @f: seq_file we are filling
+ * @p: the last profile writen
+ *
+ * Release all locking done by p_start/p_next on namespace tree
+ */
+static void p_stop(struct seq_file *f, void *p)
+ __releases(root->lock)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *profile = p;
+ struct aa_namespace *root = f->private, *ns;
+
+ if (profile) {
+ for (ns = profile->ns; ns && ns != root; ns = ns->parent)
+ read_unlock(&ns->lock);
+ }
+ read_unlock(&root->lock);
+ aa_put_namespace(root);
+}
+
+/**
+ * seq_show_profile - show a profile entry
+ * @f: seq_file to file
+ * @p: current position (profile) (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: error on failure
+ */
+static int seq_show_profile(struct seq_file *f, void *p)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *profile = (struct aa_profile *)p;
+ struct aa_namespace *root = f->private;
+
+ if (profile->ns != root)
+ seq_printf(f, ":%s://", aa_ns_name(root, profile->ns));
+ seq_printf(f, "%s (%s)\n", profile->base.hname,
+ COMPLAIN_MODE(profile) ? "complain" : "enforce");
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct seq_operations aa_fs_profiles_op = {
+ .start = p_start,
+ .next = p_next,
+ .stop = p_stop,
+ .show = seq_show_profile,
+};
+
+static int profiles_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ return seq_open(file, &aa_fs_profiles_op);
+}
+
+static int profiles_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ return seq_release(inode, file);
+}
+
+const struct file_operations aa_fs_profiles_fops = {
+ .open = profiles_open,
+ .read = seq_read,
+ .llseek = seq_lseek,
+ .release = profiles_release,
+};
+
/** Base file system setup **/
static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_file[] = {
@@ -210,6 +436,7 @@ static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_apparmor[] = {
AA_FS_FILE_FOPS(".load", 0640, &aa_fs_profile_load),
AA_FS_FILE_FOPS(".replace", 0640, &aa_fs_profile_replace),
AA_FS_FILE_FOPS(".remove", 0640, &aa_fs_profile_remove),
+ AA_FS_FILE_FOPS("profiles", 0640, &aa_fs_profiles_fops),
AA_FS_DIR("features", aa_fs_entry_features),
{ }
};
--
1.7.9.5

603
pkgs/os-specific/linux/kernel/apparmor-patches/3.4/0002-UBUNTU-SAUCE-AppArmor-basic-networking-rules.patch Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,603 @@
From 423e2cb454d75d6185eecd0c1b5cf6ccc2d8482d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date: Mon, 4 Oct 2010 15:03:36 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 2/3] UBUNTU: SAUCE: AppArmor: basic networking rules
Base support for network mediation.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
---
security/apparmor/.gitignore | 2 +-
security/apparmor/Makefile | 42 +++++++++-
security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c | 1 +
security/apparmor/include/audit.h | 4 +
security/apparmor/include/net.h | 44 ++++++++++
security/apparmor/include/policy.h | 3 +
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 112 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/apparmor/net.c | 162 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/apparmor/policy.c | 1 +
security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c | 46 ++++++++++
10 files changed, 414 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 security/apparmor/include/net.h
create mode 100644 security/apparmor/net.c
diff --git a/security/apparmor/.gitignore b/security/apparmor/.gitignore
index 4d995ae..d5b291e 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/.gitignore
+++ b/security/apparmor/.gitignore
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
#
# Generated include files
#
-af_names.h
+net_names.h
capability_names.h
rlim_names.h
diff --git a/security/apparmor/Makefile b/security/apparmor/Makefile
index 806bd19..19daa85 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/Makefile
+++ b/security/apparmor/Makefile
@@ -4,9 +4,9 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor.o
apparmor-y := apparmorfs.o audit.o capability.o context.o ipc.o lib.o match.o \
path.o domain.o policy.o policy_unpack.o procattr.o lsm.o \
- resource.o sid.o file.o
+ resource.o sid.o file.o net.o
-clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h
+clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h net_names.h
# Build a lower case string table of capability names
@@ -20,6 +20,38 @@ cmd_make-caps = echo "static const char *const capability_names[] = {" > $@ ;\
-e 's/^\#define[ \t]+CAP_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\
echo "};" >> $@
+# Build a lower case string table of address family names
+# Transform lines from
+# define AF_LOCAL 1 /* POSIX name for AF_UNIX */
+# #define AF_INET 2 /* Internet IP Protocol */
+# to
+# [1] = "local",
+# [2] = "inet",
+#
+# and build the securityfs entries for the mapping.
+# Transforms lines from
+# #define AF_INET 2 /* Internet IP Protocol */
+# to
+# #define AA_FS_AF_MASK "local inet"
+quiet_cmd_make-af = GEN $@
+cmd_make-af = echo "static const char *address_family_names[] = {" > $@ ;\
+ sed $< >>$@ -r -n -e "/AF_MAX/d" -e "/AF_LOCAL/d" -e \
+ 's/^\#define[ \t]+AF_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\
+ echo "};" >> $@ ;\
+ echo -n '\#define AA_FS_AF_MASK "' >> $@ ;\
+ sed -r -n 's/^\#define[ \t]+AF_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/\L\1/p'\
+ $< | tr '\n' ' ' | sed -e 's/ $$/"\n/' >> $@
+
+# Build a lower case string table of sock type names
+# Transform lines from
+# SOCK_STREAM = 1,
+# to
+# [1] = "stream",
+quiet_cmd_make-sock = GEN $@
+cmd_make-sock = echo "static const char *sock_type_names[] = {" >> $@ ;\
+ sed $^ >>$@ -r -n \
+ -e 's/^\tSOCK_([A-Z0-9_]+)[\t]+=[ \t]+([0-9]+)(.*)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\
+ echo "};" >> $@
# Build a lower case string table of rlimit names.
# Transforms lines from
@@ -56,6 +88,7 @@ cmd_make-rlim = echo "static const char *const rlim_names[RLIM_NLIMITS] = {" \
tr '\n' ' ' | sed -e 's/ $$/"\n/' >> $@
$(obj)/capability.o : $(obj)/capability_names.h
+$(obj)/net.o : $(obj)/net_names.h
$(obj)/resource.o : $(obj)/rlim_names.h
$(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/capability.h \
$(src)/Makefile
@@ -63,3 +96,8 @@ $(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/capability.h \
$(obj)/rlim_names.h : $(srctree)/include/asm-generic/resource.h \
$(src)/Makefile
$(call cmd,make-rlim)
+$(obj)/net_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/socket.h \
+ $(srctree)/include/linux/net.h \
+ $(src)/Makefile
+ $(call cmd,make-af)
+ $(call cmd,make-sock)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
index 89bdc62..c66315d 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
@@ -427,6 +427,7 @@ static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_domain[] = {
static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_features[] = {
AA_FS_DIR("domain", aa_fs_entry_domain),
AA_FS_DIR("file", aa_fs_entry_file),
+ AA_FS_DIR("network", aa_fs_entry_network),
AA_FS_FILE_U64("capability", VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK),
AA_FS_DIR("rlimit", aa_fs_entry_rlimit),
{ }
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
index 3868b1e..c1ff09c 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
@@ -126,6 +126,10 @@ struct apparmor_audit_data {
u32 denied;
uid_t ouid;
} fs;
+ struct {
+ int type, protocol;
+ struct sock *sk;
+ } net;
};
};
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/net.h b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cb8a121
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/net.h
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor network mediation definitions.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2012 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __AA_NET_H
+#define __AA_NET_H
+
+#include <net/sock.h>
+
+#include "apparmorfs.h"
+
+/* struct aa_net - network confinement data
+ * @allowed: basic network families permissions
+ * @audit_network: which network permissions to force audit
+ * @quiet_network: which network permissions to quiet rejects
+ */
+struct aa_net {
+ u16 allow[AF_MAX];
+ u16 audit[AF_MAX];
+ u16 quiet[AF_MAX];
+};
+
+extern struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_network[];
+
+extern int aa_net_perm(int op, struct aa_profile *profile, u16 family,
+ int type, int protocol, struct sock *sk);
+extern int aa_revalidate_sk(int op, struct sock *sk);
+
+static inline void aa_free_net_rules(struct aa_net *new)
+{
+ /* NOP */
+}
+
+#endif /* __AA_NET_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
index bda4569..eb13a73 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/policy.h
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
#include "capability.h"
#include "domain.h"
#include "file.h"
+#include "net.h"
#include "resource.h"
extern const char *const profile_mode_names[];
@@ -157,6 +158,7 @@ struct aa_policydb {
* @policy: general match rules governing policy
* @file: The set of rules governing basic file access and domain transitions
* @caps: capabilities for the profile
+ * @net: network controls for the profile
* @rlimits: rlimits for the profile
*
* The AppArmor profile contains the basic confinement data. Each profile
@@ -194,6 +196,7 @@ struct aa_profile {
struct aa_policydb policy;
struct aa_file_rules file;
struct aa_caps caps;
+ struct aa_net net;
struct aa_rlimit rlimits;
};
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index ad05d39..3cde194 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
#include "include/context.h"
#include "include/file.h"
#include "include/ipc.h"
+#include "include/net.h"
#include "include/path.h"
#include "include/policy.h"
#include "include/procattr.h"
@@ -622,6 +623,104 @@ static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task,
return error;
}
+static int apparmor_socket_create(int family, int type, int protocol, int kern)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *profile;
+ int error = 0;
+
+ if (kern)
+ return 0;
+
+ profile = __aa_current_profile();
+ if (!unconfined(profile))
+ error = aa_net_perm(OP_CREATE, profile, family, type, protocol,
+ NULL);
+ return error;
+}
+
+static int apparmor_socket_bind(struct socket *sock,
+ struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
+{
+ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+
+ return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_BIND, sk);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_socket_connect(struct socket *sock,
+ struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
+{
+ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+
+ return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_CONNECT, sk);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
+{
+ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+
+ return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_LISTEN, sk);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
+{
+ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+
+ return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_ACCEPT, sk);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock,
+ struct msghdr *msg, int size)
+{
+ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+
+ return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_SENDMSG, sk);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock,
+ struct msghdr *msg, int size, int flags)
+{
+ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+
+ return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_RECVMSG, sk);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
+{
+ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+
+ return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_GETSOCKNAME, sk);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
+{
+ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+
+ return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_GETPEERNAME, sk);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
+ int optname)
+{
+ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+
+ return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_GETSOCKOPT, sk);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
+ int optname)
+{
+ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+
+ return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_SETSOCKOPT, sk);
+}
+
+static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
+{
+ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+
+ return aa_revalidate_sk(OP_SOCK_SHUTDOWN, sk);
+}
+
static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = {
.name = "apparmor",
@@ -653,6 +752,19 @@ static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = {
.getprocattr = apparmor_getprocattr,
.setprocattr = apparmor_setprocattr,
+ .socket_create = apparmor_socket_create,
+ .socket_bind = apparmor_socket_bind,
+ .socket_connect = apparmor_socket_connect,
+ .socket_listen = apparmor_socket_listen,
+ .socket_accept = apparmor_socket_accept,
+ .socket_sendmsg = apparmor_socket_sendmsg,
+ .socket_recvmsg = apparmor_socket_recvmsg,
+ .socket_getsockname = apparmor_socket_getsockname,
+ .socket_getpeername = apparmor_socket_getpeername,
+ .socket_getsockopt = apparmor_socket_getsockopt,
+ .socket_setsockopt = apparmor_socket_setsockopt,
+ .socket_shutdown = apparmor_socket_shutdown,
+
.cred_alloc_blank = apparmor_cred_alloc_blank,
.cred_free = apparmor_cred_free,
.cred_prepare = apparmor_cred_prepare,
diff --git a/security/apparmor/net.c b/security/apparmor/net.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..084232b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/net.c
@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor network mediation
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2012 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#include "include/apparmor.h"
+#include "include/audit.h"
+#include "include/context.h"
+#include "include/net.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
+
+#include "net_names.h"
+
+struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_network[] = {
+ AA_FS_FILE_STRING("af_mask", AA_FS_AF_MASK),
+ { }
+};
+
+/* audit callback for net specific fields */
+static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
+{
+ struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
+
+ audit_log_format(ab, " family=");
+ if (address_family_names[sa->u.net->family]) {
+ audit_log_string(ab, address_family_names[sa->u.net->family]);
+ } else {
+ audit_log_format(ab, "\"unknown(%d)\"", sa->u.net->family);
+ }
+ audit_log_format(ab, " sock_type=");
+ if (sock_type_names[sa->aad->net.type]) {
+ audit_log_string(ab, sock_type_names[sa->aad->net.type]);
+ } else {
+ audit_log_format(ab, "\"unknown(%d)\"", sa->aad->net.type);
+ }
+ audit_log_format(ab, " protocol=%d", sa->aad->net.protocol);
+}
+
+/**
+ * audit_net - audit network access
+ * @profile: profile being enforced (NOT NULL)
+ * @op: operation being checked
+ * @family: network family
+ * @type: network type
+ * @protocol: network protocol
+ * @sk: socket auditing is being applied to
+ * @error: error code for failure else 0
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 or sa->error else other errorcode on failure
+ */
+static int audit_net(struct aa_profile *profile, int op, u16 family, int type,
+ int protocol, struct sock *sk, int error)
+{
+ int audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
+ struct common_audit_data sa;
+ struct apparmor_audit_data aad = { };
+ struct lsm_network_audit net = { };
+ if (sk) {
+ COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NET);
+ } else {
+ COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE);
+ }
+ /* todo fill in socket addr info */
+ sa.aad = &aad;
+ sa.u.net = &net;
+ sa.aad->op = op,
+ sa.u.net->family = family;
+ sa.u.net->sk = sk;
+ sa.aad->net.type = type;
+ sa.aad->net.protocol = protocol;
+ sa.aad->error = error;
+
+ if (likely(!sa.aad->error)) {
+ u16 audit_mask = profile->net.audit[sa.u.net->family];
+ if (likely((AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL) &&
+ !(1 << sa.aad->net.type & audit_mask)))
+ return 0;
+ audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT;
+ } else {
+ u16 quiet_mask = profile->net.quiet[sa.u.net->family];
+ u16 kill_mask = 0;
+ u16 denied = (1 << sa.aad->net.type) & ~quiet_mask;
+
+ if (denied & kill_mask)
+ audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
+
+ if ((denied & quiet_mask) &&
+ AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_NOQUIET &&
+ AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL)
+ return COMPLAIN_MODE(profile) ? 0 : sa.aad->error;
+ }
+
+ return aa_audit(audit_type, profile, GFP_KERNEL, &sa, audit_cb);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_net_perm - very course network access check
+ * @op: operation being checked
+ * @profile: profile being enforced (NOT NULL)
+ * @family: network family
+ * @type: network type
+ * @protocol: network protocol
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 else error if permission denied
+ */
+int aa_net_perm(int op, struct aa_profile *profile, u16 family, int type,
+ int protocol, struct sock *sk)
+{
+ u16 family_mask;
+ int error;
+
+ if ((family < 0) || (family >= AF_MAX))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if ((type < 0) || (type >= SOCK_MAX))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* unix domain and netlink sockets are handled by ipc */
+ if (family == AF_UNIX || family == AF_NETLINK)
+ return 0;
+
+ family_mask = profile->net.allow[family];
+
+ error = (family_mask & (1 << type)) ? 0 : -EACCES;
+
+ return audit_net(profile, op, family, type, protocol, sk, error);
+}
+
+/**
+ * aa_revalidate_sk - Revalidate access to a sock
+ * @op: operation being checked
+ * @sk: sock being revalidated (NOT NULL)
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 else error if permission denied
+ */
+int aa_revalidate_sk(int op, struct sock *sk)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *profile;
+ int error = 0;
+
+ /* aa_revalidate_sk should not be called from interrupt context
+ * don't mediate these calls as they are not task related
+ */
+ if (in_interrupt())
+ return 0;
+
+ profile = __aa_current_profile();
+ if (!unconfined(profile))
+ error = aa_net_perm(op, profile, sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
+ sk->sk_protocol, sk);
+
+ return error;
+}
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c
index f1f7506..b8100a7 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c
@@ -745,6 +745,7 @@ static void free_profile(struct aa_profile *profile)
aa_free_file_rules(&profile->file);
aa_free_cap_rules(&profile->caps);
+ aa_free_net_rules(&profile->net);
aa_free_rlimit_rules(&profile->rlimits);
aa_free_sid(profile->sid);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
index deab7c7..8f8e9c1 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
@@ -193,6 +193,19 @@ fail:
return 0;
}
+static bool unpack_u16(struct aa_ext *e, u16 *data, const char *name)
+{
+ if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_U16, name)) {
+ if (!inbounds(e, sizeof(u16)))
+ return 0;
+ if (data)
+ *data = le16_to_cpu(get_unaligned((u16 *) e->pos));
+ e->pos += sizeof(u16);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
static bool unpack_u32(struct aa_ext *e, u32 *data, const char *name)
{
if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_U32, name)) {
@@ -471,6 +484,7 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e)
{
struct aa_profile *profile = NULL;
const char *name = NULL;
+ size_t size = 0;
int i, error = -EPROTO;
kernel_cap_t tmpcap;
u32 tmp;
@@ -564,6 +578,38 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e)
if (!unpack_rlimits(e, profile))
goto fail;
+ size = unpack_array(e, "net_allowed_af");
+ if (size) {
+
+ for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
+ /* discard extraneous rules that this kernel will
+ * never request
+ */
+ if (i >= AF_MAX) {
+ u16 tmp;
+ if (!unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL) ||
+ !unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL) ||
+ !unpack_u16(e, &tmp, NULL))
+ goto fail;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.allow[i], NULL))
+ goto fail;
+ if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.audit[i], NULL))
+ goto fail;
+ if (!unpack_u16(e, &profile->net.quiet[i], NULL))
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_ARRAYEND, NULL))
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ /*
+ * allow unix domain and netlink sockets they are handled
+ * by IPC
+ */
+ profile->net.allow[AF_UNIX] = 0xffff;
+ profile->net.allow[AF_NETLINK] = 0xffff;
+
if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "policydb")) {
/* generic policy dfa - optional and may be NULL */
profile->policy.dfa = unpack_dfa(e);
--
1.7.9.5

957
pkgs/os-specific/linux/kernel/apparmor-patches/3.4/0003-UBUNTU-SAUCE-apparmor-Add-the-ability-to-mediate-mou.patch Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,957 @@
From a94d5e11c0484af59e5feebf144cc48c186892ad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date: Wed, 16 May 2012 10:58:05 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 3/3] UBUNTU: SAUCE: apparmor: Add the ability to mediate
mount
Add the ability for apparmor to do mediation of mount operations. Mount
rules require an updated apparmor_parser (2.8 series) for policy compilation.
The basic form of the rules are.
[audit] [deny] mount [conds]* [device] [ -> [conds] path],
[audit] [deny] remount [conds]* [path],
[audit] [deny] umount [conds]* [path],
[audit] [deny] pivotroot [oldroot=<value>] <path>
remount is just a short cut for mount options=remount
where [conds] can be
fstype=<expr>
options=<expr>
Example mount commands
mount, # allow all mounts, but not umount or pivotroot
mount fstype=procfs, # allow mounting procfs anywhere
mount options=(bind, ro) /foo -> /bar, # readonly bind mount
mount /dev/sda -> /mnt,
mount /dev/sd** -> /mnt/**,
mount fstype=overlayfs options=(rw,upperdir=/tmp/upper/,lowerdir=/) -> /mnt/
umount,
umount /m*,
See the apparmor userspace for full documentation
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
---
security/apparmor/Makefile | 2 +-
security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c | 13 +
security/apparmor/audit.c | 4 +
security/apparmor/domain.c | 2 +-
security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h | 3 +-
security/apparmor/include/audit.h | 11 +
security/apparmor/include/domain.h | 2 +
security/apparmor/include/mount.h | 54 +++
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 59 ++++
security/apparmor/mount.c | 620 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
10 files changed, 767 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 security/apparmor/include/mount.h
create mode 100644 security/apparmor/mount.c
diff --git a/security/apparmor/Makefile b/security/apparmor/Makefile
index 19daa85..63e0a4c 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/Makefile
+++ b/security/apparmor/Makefile
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor.o
apparmor-y := apparmorfs.o audit.o capability.o context.o ipc.o lib.o match.o \
path.o domain.o policy.o policy_unpack.o procattr.o lsm.o \
- resource.o sid.o file.o net.o
+ resource.o sid.o file.o net.o mount.o
clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h net_names.h
diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
index c66315d..ff19009 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
@@ -424,10 +424,23 @@ static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_domain[] = {
{ }
};
+static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_mount[] = {
+ AA_FS_FILE_STRING("mask", "mount umount"),
+ { }
+};
+
+static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_namespaces[] = {
+ AA_FS_FILE_BOOLEAN("profile", 1),
+ AA_FS_FILE_BOOLEAN("pivot_root", 1),
+ { }
+};
+
static struct aa_fs_entry aa_fs_entry_features[] = {
AA_FS_DIR("domain", aa_fs_entry_domain),
AA_FS_DIR("file", aa_fs_entry_file),
AA_FS_DIR("network", aa_fs_entry_network),
+ AA_FS_DIR("mount", aa_fs_entry_mount),
+ AA_FS_DIR("namespaces", aa_fs_entry_namespaces),
AA_FS_FILE_U64("capability", VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK),
AA_FS_DIR("rlimit", aa_fs_entry_rlimit),
{ }
diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c
index cc3520d..b9f5ee9 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/audit.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c
@@ -44,6 +44,10 @@ const char *const op_table[] = {
"file_mmap",
"file_mprotect",
+ "pivotroot",
+ "mount",
+ "umount",
+
"create",
"post_create",
"bind",
diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c
index 6327685..dfdc47b 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/domain.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ static const char *next_name(int xtype, const char *name)
*
* Returns: refcounted profile, or NULL on failure (MAYBE NULL)
*/
-static struct aa_profile *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex)
+struct aa_profile *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex)
{
struct aa_profile *new_profile = NULL;
struct aa_namespace *ns = profile->ns;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
index 40aedd9..e243d96 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h
@@ -29,8 +29,9 @@
#define AA_CLASS_NET 4
#define AA_CLASS_RLIMITS 5
#define AA_CLASS_DOMAIN 6
+#define AA_CLASS_MOUNT 7
-#define AA_CLASS_LAST AA_CLASS_DOMAIN
+#define AA_CLASS_LAST AA_CLASS_MOUNT
/* Control parameters settable through module/boot flags */
extern enum audit_mode aa_g_audit;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
index c1ff09c..7b90900c 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h
@@ -73,6 +73,10 @@ enum aa_ops {
OP_FMMAP,
OP_FMPROT,
+ OP_PIVOTROOT,
+ OP_MOUNT,
+ OP_UMOUNT,
+
OP_CREATE,
OP_POST_CREATE,
OP_BIND,
@@ -121,6 +125,13 @@ struct apparmor_audit_data {
unsigned long max;
} rlim;
struct {
+ const char *src_name;
+ const char *type;
+ const char *trans;
+ const char *data;
+ unsigned long flags;
+ } mnt;
+ struct {
const char *target;
u32 request;
u32 denied;
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/domain.h b/security/apparmor/include/domain.h
index de04464..a3f70c5 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/include/domain.h
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/domain.h
@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ struct aa_domain {
char **table;
};
+struct aa_profile *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex);
+
int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
int apparmor_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
void apparmor_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/mount.h b/security/apparmor/include/mount.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bc17a53
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/include/mount.h
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor file mediation function definitions.
+ *
+ * Copyright 2012 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __AA_MOUNT_H
+#define __AA_MOUNT_H
+
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/path.h>
+
+#include "domain.h"
+#include "policy.h"
+
+/* mount perms */
+#define AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT 0x01
+#define AA_MAY_MOUNT 0x02
+#define AA_MAY_UMOUNT 0x04
+#define AA_AUDIT_DATA 0x40
+#define AA_CONT_MATCH 0x40
+
+#define AA_MS_IGNORE_MASK (MS_KERNMOUNT | MS_NOSEC | MS_ACTIVE | MS_BORN)
+
+int aa_remount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path,
+ unsigned long flags, void *data);
+
+int aa_bind_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path,
+ const char *old_name, unsigned long flags);
+
+
+int aa_mount_change_type(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path,
+ unsigned long flags);
+
+int aa_move_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path,
+ const char *old_name);
+
+int aa_new_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *dev_name,
+ struct path *path, const char *type, unsigned long flags,
+ void *data);
+
+int aa_umount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags);
+
+int aa_pivotroot(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *old_path,
+ struct path *new_path);
+
+#endif /* __AA_MOUNT_H */
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 3cde194..4512cc6 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
#include "include/path.h"
#include "include/policy.h"
#include "include/procattr.h"
+#include "include/mount.h"
/* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */
int apparmor_initialized __initdata;
@@ -512,6 +513,60 @@ static int apparmor_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
!(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) ? MAP_PRIVATE : 0);
}
+static int apparmor_sb_mount(char *dev_name, struct path *path, char *type,
+ unsigned long flags, void *data)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *profile;
+ int error = 0;
+
+ /* Discard magic */
+ if ((flags & MS_MGC_MSK) == MS_MGC_VAL)
+ flags &= ~MS_MGC_MSK;
+
+ flags &= ~AA_MS_IGNORE_MASK;
+
+ profile = __aa_current_profile();
+ if (!unconfined(profile)) {
+ if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
+ error = aa_remount(profile, path, flags, data);
+ else if (flags & MS_BIND)
+ error = aa_bind_mount(profile, path, dev_name, flags);
+ else if (flags & (MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE |
+ MS_UNBINDABLE))
+ error = aa_mount_change_type(profile, path, flags);
+ else if (flags & MS_MOVE)
+ error = aa_move_mount(profile, path, dev_name);
+ else
+ error = aa_new_mount(profile, dev_name, path, type,
+ flags, data);
+ }
+ return error;
+}
+
+static int apparmor_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *profile;
+ int error = 0;
+
+ profile = __aa_current_profile();
+ if (!unconfined(profile))
+ error = aa_umount(profile, mnt, flags);
+
+ return error;
+}
+
+static int apparmor_sb_pivotroot(struct path *old_path, struct path *new_path)
+{
+ struct aa_profile *profile;
+ int error = 0;
+
+ profile = __aa_current_profile();
+ if (!unconfined(profile))
+ error = aa_pivotroot(profile, old_path, new_path);
+
+ return error;
+}
+
static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
char **value)
{
@@ -729,6 +784,10 @@ static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = {
.capget = apparmor_capget,
.capable = apparmor_capable,
+ .sb_mount = apparmor_sb_mount,
+ .sb_umount = apparmor_sb_umount,
+ .sb_pivotroot = apparmor_sb_pivotroot,
+
.path_link = apparmor_path_link,
.path_unlink = apparmor_path_unlink,
.path_symlink = apparmor_path_symlink,
diff --git a/security/apparmor/mount.c b/security/apparmor/mount.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..63d8493
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/apparmor/mount.c
@@ -0,0 +1,620 @@
+/*
+ * AppArmor security module
+ *
+ * This file contains AppArmor mediation of files
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE
+ * Copyright 2009-2012 Canonical Ltd.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/namei.h>
+
+#include "include/apparmor.h"
+#include "include/audit.h"
+#include "include/context.h"
+#include "include/domain.h"
+#include "include/file.h"
+#include "include/match.h"
+#include "include/mount.h"
+#include "include/path.h"
+#include "include/policy.h"
+
+
+static void audit_mnt_flags(struct audit_buffer *ab, unsigned long flags)
+{
+ if (flags & MS_RDONLY)
+ audit_log_format(ab, "ro");
+ else
+ audit_log_format(ab, "rw");
+ if (flags & MS_NOSUID)
+ audit_log_format(ab, ", nosuid");
+ if (flags & MS_NODEV)
+ audit_log_format(ab, ", nodev");
+ if (flags & MS_NOEXEC)
+ audit_log_format(ab, ", noexec");
+ if (flags & MS_SYNCHRONOUS)
+ audit_log_format(ab, ", sync");
+ if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
+ audit_log_format(ab, ", remount");
+ if (flags & MS_MANDLOCK)
+ audit_log_format(ab, ", mand");
+ if (flags & MS_DIRSYNC)
+ audit_log_format(ab, ", dirsync");
+ if (flags & MS_NOATIME)
+ audit_log_format(ab, ", noatime");
+ if (flags & MS_NODIRATIME)
+ audit_log_format(ab, ", nodiratime");
+ if (flags & MS_BIND)
+ audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rbind" : ", bind");
+ if (flags & MS_MOVE)
+ audit_log_format(ab, ", move");
+ if (flags & MS_SILENT)
+ audit_log_format(ab, ", silent");
+ if (flags & MS_POSIXACL)
+ audit_log_format(ab, ", acl");
+ if (flags & MS_UNBINDABLE)
+ audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", runbindable" :
+ ", unbindable");
+ if (flags & MS_PRIVATE)
+ audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rprivate" :
+ ", private");
+ if (flags & MS_SLAVE)
+ audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rslave" :
+ ", slave");
+ if (flags & MS_SHARED)
+ audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rshared" :
+ ", shared");
+ if (flags & MS_RELATIME)
+ audit_log_format(ab, ", relatime");
+ if (flags & MS_I_VERSION)
+ audit_log_format(ab, ", iversion");
+ if (flags & MS_STRICTATIME)
+ audit_log_format(ab, ", strictatime");
+ if (flags & MS_NOUSER)
+ audit_log_format(ab, ", nouser");
+}
+
+/**
+ * audit_cb - call back for mount specific audit fields
+ * @ab: audit_buffer (NOT NULL)
+ * @va: audit struct to audit values of (NOT NULL)
+ */
+static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va)
+{
+ struct common_audit_data *sa = va;
+
+ if (sa->aad->mnt.type) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " fstype=");
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->mnt.type);
+ }
+ if (sa->aad->mnt.src_name) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " srcname=");
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->mnt.src_name);
+ }
+ if (sa->aad->mnt.trans) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " trans=");
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->mnt.trans);
+ }
+ if (sa->aad->mnt.flags || sa->aad->op == OP_MOUNT) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " flags=\"");
+ audit_mnt_flags(ab, sa->aad->mnt.flags);
+ audit_log_format(ab, "\"");
+ }
+ if (sa->aad->mnt.data) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " options=");
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sa->aad->mnt.data);
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * audit_mount - handle the auditing of mount operations
+ * @profile: the profile being enforced (NOT NULL)
+ * @gfp: allocation flags
+ * @op: operation being mediated (NOT NULL)
+ * @name: name of object being mediated (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @src_name: src_name of object being mediated (MAYBE_NULL)
+ * @type: type of filesystem (MAYBE_NULL)
+ * @trans: name of trans (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @flags: filesystem idependent mount flags
+ * @data: filesystem mount flags
+ * @request: permissions requested
+ * @perms: the permissions computed for the request (NOT NULL)
+ * @info: extra information message (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @error: 0 if operation allowed else failure error code
+ *
+ * Returns: %0 or error on failure
+ */
+static int audit_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, gfp_t gfp, int op,
+ const char *name, const char *src_name,
+ const char *type, const char *trans,
+ unsigned long flags, const void *data, u32 request,
+ struct file_perms *perms, const char *info, int error)
+{
+ int audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO;
+ struct common_audit_data sa;
+ struct apparmor_audit_data aad = { };
+
+ if (likely(!error)) {
+ u32 mask = perms->audit;
+
+ if (unlikely(AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_ALL))
+ mask = 0xffff;
+
+ /* mask off perms that are not being force audited */
+ request &= mask;
+
+ if (likely(!request))
+ return 0;
+ audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT;
+ } else {
+ /* only report permissions that were denied */
+ request = request & ~perms->allow;
+
+ if (request & perms->kill)
+ audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL;
+
+ /* quiet known rejects, assumes quiet and kill do not overlap */
+ if ((request & perms->quiet) &&
+ AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_NOQUIET &&
+ AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL)
+ request &= ~perms->quiet;
+
+ if (!request)
+ return COMPLAIN_MODE(profile) ?
+ complain_error(error) : error;
+ }
+
+ COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE);
+ sa.aad = &aad;
+ sa.aad->op = op;
+ sa.aad->name = name;
+ sa.aad->mnt.src_name = src_name;
+ sa.aad->mnt.type = type;
+ sa.aad->mnt.trans = trans;
+ sa.aad->mnt.flags = flags;
+ if (data && (perms->audit & AA_AUDIT_DATA))
+ sa.aad->mnt.data = data;
+ sa.aad->info = info;
+ sa.aad->error = error;
+
+ return aa_audit(audit_type, profile, gfp, &sa, audit_cb);
+}
+
+/**
+ * match_mnt_flags - Do an ordered match on mount flags
+ * @dfa: dfa to match against
+ * @state: state to start in
+ * @flags: mount flags to match against
+ *
+ * Mount flags are encoded as an ordered match. This is done instead of
+ * checking against a simple bitmask, to allow for logical operations
+ * on the flags.
+ *
+ * Returns: next state after flags match
+ */
+static unsigned int match_mnt_flags(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state,
+ unsigned long flags)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i <= 31 ; ++i) {
+ if ((1 << i) & flags)
+ state = aa_dfa_next(dfa, state, i + 1);
+ }
+
+ return state;
+}
+
+/**
+ * compute_mnt_perms - compute mount permission associated with @state
+ * @dfa: dfa to match against (NOT NULL)
+ * @state: state match finished in
+ *
+ * Returns: mount permissions
+ */
+static struct file_perms compute_mnt_perms(struct aa_dfa *dfa,
+ unsigned int state)
+{
+ struct file_perms perms;
+
+ perms.kill = 0;
+ perms.allow = dfa_user_allow(dfa, state);
+ perms.audit = dfa_user_audit(dfa, state);
+ perms.quiet = dfa_user_quiet(dfa, state);
+ perms.xindex = dfa_user_xindex(dfa, state);
+
+ return perms;
+}
+
+static const char const *mnt_info_table[] = {
+ "match succeeded",
+ "failed mntpnt match",
+ "failed srcname match",
+ "failed type match",
+ "failed flags match",
+ "failed data match"
+};
+
+/*
+ * Returns 0 on success else element that match failed in, this is the
+ * index into the mnt_info_table above
+ */
+static int do_match_mnt(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start,
+ const char *mntpnt, const char *devname,
+ const char *type, unsigned long flags,
+ void *data, bool binary, struct file_perms *perms)
+{
+ unsigned int state;
+
+ state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, start, mntpnt);
+ state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state);
+ if (!state)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (devname)
+ state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, state, devname);
+ state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state);
+ if (!state)
+ return 2;
+
+ if (type)
+ state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, state, type);
+ state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state);
+ if (!state)
+ return 3;
+
+ state = match_mnt_flags(dfa, state, flags);
+ if (!state)
+ return 4;
+ *perms = compute_mnt_perms(dfa, state);
+ if (perms->allow & AA_MAY_MOUNT)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* only match data if not binary and the DFA flags data is expected */
+ if (data && !binary && (perms->allow & AA_CONT_MATCH)) {
+ state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state);
+ if (!state)
+ return 4;
+
+ state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, state, data);
+ if (!state)
+ return 5;
+ *perms = compute_mnt_perms(dfa, state);
+ if (perms->allow & AA_MAY_MOUNT)
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* failed at end of flags match */
+ return 4;
+}
+
+/**
+ * match_mnt - handle path matching for mount
+ * @profile: the confining profile
+ * @mntpnt: string for the mntpnt (NOT NULL)
+ * @devname: string for the devname/src_name (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @type: string for the dev type (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @flags: mount flags to match
+ * @data: fs mount data (MAYBE NULL)
+ * @binary: whether @data is binary
+ * @perms: Returns: permission found by the match
+ * @info: Returns: infomation string about the match for logging
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 on success else error
+ */
+static int match_mnt(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *mntpnt,
+ const char *devname, const char *type,
+ unsigned long flags, void *data, bool binary,
+ struct file_perms *perms, const char **info)
+{
+ int pos;
+
+ if (!profile->policy.dfa)
+ return -EACCES;
+
+ pos = do_match_mnt(profile->policy.dfa,
+ profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT],
+ mntpnt, devname, type, flags, data, binary, perms);
+ if (pos) {
+ *info = mnt_info_table[pos];
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int path_flags(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path)
+{
+ return profile->path_flags |
+ S_ISDIR(path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode) ? PATH_IS_DIR : 0;
+}
+
+int aa_remount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path,
+ unsigned long flags, void *data)
+{
+ struct file_perms perms = { };
+ const char *name, *info = NULL;
+ char *buffer = NULL;
+ int binary, error;
+
+ binary = path->dentry->d_sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA;
+
+ error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name,
+ &info);
+ if (error)
+ goto audit;
+
+ error = match_mnt(profile, name, NULL, NULL, flags, data, binary,
+ &perms, &info);
+
+audit:
+ error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name, NULL, NULL,
+ NULL, flags, data, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms, info,
+ error);
+ kfree(buffer);
+
+ return error;
+}
+
+int aa_bind_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path,
+ const char *dev_name, unsigned long flags)
+{
+ struct file_perms perms = { };
+ char *buffer = NULL, *old_buffer = NULL;
+ const char *name, *old_name = NULL, *info = NULL;
+ struct path old_path;
+ int error;
+
+ if (!dev_name || !*dev_name)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ flags &= MS_REC | MS_BIND;
+
+ error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name,
+ &info);
+ if (error)
+ goto audit;
+
+ error = kern_path(dev_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW|LOOKUP_AUTOMOUNT, &old_path);
+ if (error)
+ goto audit;
+
+ error = aa_path_name(&old_path, path_flags(profile, &old_path),
+ &old_buffer, &old_name, &info);
+ path_put(&old_path);
+ if (error)
+ goto audit;
+
+ error = match_mnt(profile, name, old_name, NULL, flags, NULL, 0,
+ &perms, &info);
+
+audit:
+ error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name, old_name,
+ NULL, NULL, flags, NULL, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms,
+ info, error);
+ kfree(buffer);
+ kfree(old_buffer);
+
+ return error;
+}
+
+int aa_mount_change_type(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path,
+ unsigned long flags)
+{
+ struct file_perms perms = { };
+ char *buffer = NULL;
+ const char *name, *info = NULL;
+ int error;
+
+ /* These are the flags allowed by do_change_type() */
+ flags &= (MS_REC | MS_SILENT | MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE |
+ MS_UNBINDABLE);
+
+ error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name,
+ &info);
+ if (error)
+ goto audit;
+
+ error = match_mnt(profile, name, NULL, NULL, flags, NULL, 0, &perms,
+ &info);
+
+audit:
+ error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name, NULL, NULL,
+ NULL, flags, NULL, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms, info,
+ error);
+ kfree(buffer);
+
+ return error;
+}
+
+int aa_move_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path,
+ const char *orig_name)
+{
+ struct file_perms perms = { };
+ char *buffer = NULL, *old_buffer = NULL;
+ const char *name, *old_name = NULL, *info = NULL;
+ struct path old_path;
+ int error;
+
+ if (!orig_name || !*orig_name)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name,
+ &info);
+ if (error)
+ goto audit;
+
+ error = kern_path(orig_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &old_path);
+ if (error)
+ goto audit;
+
+ error = aa_path_name(&old_path, path_flags(profile, &old_path),
+ &old_buffer, &old_name, &info);
+ path_put(&old_path);
+ if (error)
+ goto audit;
+
+ error = match_mnt(profile, name, old_name, NULL, MS_MOVE, NULL, 0,
+ &perms, &info);
+
+audit:
+ error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name, old_name,
+ NULL, NULL, MS_MOVE, NULL, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms,
+ info, error);
+ kfree(buffer);
+ kfree(old_buffer);
+
+ return error;
+}
+
+int aa_new_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *orig_dev_name,
+ struct path *path, const char *type, unsigned long flags,
+ void *data)
+{
+ struct file_perms perms = { };
+ char *buffer = NULL, *dev_buffer = NULL;
+ const char *name = NULL, *dev_name = NULL, *info = NULL;
+ int binary = 1;
+ int error;
+
+ dev_name = orig_dev_name;
+ if (type) {
+ int requires_dev;
+ struct file_system_type *fstype = get_fs_type(type);
+ if (!fstype)
+ return -ENODEV;
+
+ binary = fstype->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA;
+ requires_dev = fstype->fs_flags & FS_REQUIRES_DEV;
+ put_filesystem(fstype);
+
+ if (requires_dev) {
+ struct path dev_path;
+
+ if (!dev_name || !*dev_name) {
+ error = -ENOENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ error = kern_path(dev_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &dev_path);
+ if (error)
+ goto audit;
+
+ error = aa_path_name(&dev_path,
+ path_flags(profile, &dev_path),
+ &dev_buffer, &dev_name, &info);
+ path_put(&dev_path);
+ if (error)
+ goto audit;
+ }
+ }
+
+ error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), &buffer, &name,
+ &info);
+ if (error)
+ goto audit;
+
+ error = match_mnt(profile, name, dev_name, type, flags, data, binary,
+ &perms, &info);
+
+audit:
+ error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_MOUNT, name, dev_name,
+ type, NULL, flags, data, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms, info,
+ error);
+ kfree(buffer);
+ kfree(dev_buffer);
+
+out:
+ return error;
+
+}
+
+int aa_umount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
+{
+ struct file_perms perms = { };
+ char *buffer = NULL;
+ const char *name, *info = NULL;
+ int error;
+
+ struct path path = { mnt, mnt->mnt_root };
+ error = aa_path_name(&path, path_flags(profile, &path), &buffer, &name,
+ &info);
+ if (error)
+ goto audit;
+
+ if (!error && profile->policy.dfa) {
+ unsigned int state;
+ state = aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa,
+ profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT],
+ name);
+ perms = compute_mnt_perms(profile->policy.dfa, state);
+ }
+
+ if (AA_MAY_UMOUNT & ~perms.allow)
+ error = -EACCES;
+
+audit:
+ error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_UMOUNT, name, NULL, NULL,
+ NULL, 0, NULL, AA_MAY_UMOUNT, &perms, info, error);
+ kfree(buffer);
+
+ return error;
+}
+
+int aa_pivotroot(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *old_path,
+ struct path *new_path)
+{
+ struct file_perms perms = { };
+ struct aa_profile *target = NULL;
+ char *old_buffer = NULL, *new_buffer = NULL;
+ const char *old_name, *new_name = NULL, *info = NULL;
+ int error;
+
+ error = aa_path_name(old_path, path_flags(profile, old_path),
+ &old_buffer, &old_name, &info);
+ if (error)
+ goto audit;
+
+ error = aa_path_name(new_path, path_flags(profile, new_path),
+ &new_buffer, &new_name, &info);
+ if (error)
+ goto audit;
+
+ if (profile->policy.dfa) {
+ unsigned int state;
+ state = aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa,
+ profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT],
+ new_name);
+ state = aa_dfa_null_transition(profile->policy.dfa, state);
+ state = aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa, state, old_name);
+ perms = compute_mnt_perms(profile->policy.dfa, state);
+ }
+
+ if (AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT & perms.allow) {
+ if ((perms.xindex & AA_X_TYPE_MASK) == AA_X_TABLE) {
+ target = x_table_lookup(profile, perms.xindex);
+ if (!target)
+ error = -ENOENT;
+ else
+ error = aa_replace_current_profile(target);
+ }
+ } else
+ error = -EACCES;
+
+audit:
+ error = audit_mount(profile, GFP_KERNEL, OP_PIVOTROOT, new_name,
+ old_name, NULL, target ? target->base.name : NULL,
+ 0, NULL, AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT, &perms, info, error);
+ aa_put_profile(target);
+ kfree(old_buffer);
+ kfree(new_buffer);
+
+ return error;
+}
--
1.7.9.5

4
pkgs/os-specific/linux/kernel/common-config.nix
View file

@ -177,6 +177,10 @@ with stdenv.lib;
USER_NS y # Support for user namespaces
''}
# AppArmor support
SECURITY_APPARMOR y
DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR y
# Misc. options.
8139TOO_8129 y
8139TOO_PIO n # PIO is slower

16
pkgs/os-specific/linux/kernel/linux-3.2.nix
View file

@ -9,5 +9,19 @@ import ./generic.nix (args // rec {
sha256 = "1mszzixiv4k61m241dl2n5s8rca26l6hc40v23lha814nrahjkn1";
};
features.iwlwifi = true;
# We don't provide these patches if grsecurity is enabled, because
# the grsec 3.2 -stable patchset already includes them.
kernelPatches = args.kernelPatches ++ (
stdenv.lib.optional (!(args.features.grsecurity or false))
[ { name = "0001-AppArmor-compatibility-patch-for-v5-network-controll";
patch = ./apparmor-patches/3.2/0001-AppArmor-compatibility-patch-for-v5-network-controll.patch;
}
{ name = "0002-AppArmor-compatibility-patch-for-v5-interface";
patch = ./apparmor-patches/3.2/0002-AppArmor-compatibility-patch-for-v5-interface.patch;
}
{ name = "0003-AppArmor-Allow-dfa-backward-compatibility-with-broke";
patch = ./apparmor-patches/3.2/0003-AppArmor-Allow-dfa-backward-compatibility-with-broke.patch;
}]);
features.iwlwifi = true;
} // (args.argsOverride or {}))

11
pkgs/os-specific/linux/kernel/linux-3.4.nix
View file

@ -9,6 +9,17 @@ import ./generic.nix (args // rec {
sha256 = "0kh4y1sbsjm3awplfsd0i59rz7wc1dj23mcs5rwwhc0p7i8w4r75";
};
kernelPatches = args.kernelPatches ++
[ { name = "0001-UBUNTU-SAUCE-AppArmor-Add-profile-introspection-file";
patch = ./apparmor-patches/3.4/0001-UBUNTU-SAUCE-AppArmor-Add-profile-introspection-file.patch;
}
{ name = "0002-UBUNTU-SAUCE-AppArmor-basic-networking-rules";
patch = ./apparmor-patches/3.4/0002-UBUNTU-SAUCE-AppArmor-basic-networking-rules.patch;
}
{ name = "0003-UBUNTU-SAUCE-apparmor-Add-the-ability-to-mediate-mou";
patch = ./apparmor-patches/3.4/0003-UBUNTU-SAUCE-apparmor-Add-the-ability-to-mediate-mou.patch;
}];
features.iwlwifi = true;
features.efiBootStub = true;
features.needsCifsUtils = true;

25
pkgs/os-specific/linux/kernel/patches.nix
View file

@ -26,37 +26,12 @@ let
inherit sha256;
};
features.grsecurity = true;
# The grsec kernel patchset includes AppArmor patches
features.apparmor = true;
};
makeAppArmorPatch = {apparmor, version}:
stdenv.mkDerivation {
name = "apparmor-${version}.patch";
phases = ["installPhase"];
installPhase = ''
cat ${apparmor}/kernel-patches/${version}/* > $out
'';
};
in
rec {
apparmor_3_2 = rec {
version = "3.2";
name = "apparmor-${version}";
patch = makeAppArmorPatch { inherit apparmor version; };
features.apparmor = true;
};
apparmor_3_4 = rec {
version = "3.4";
name = "apparmor-${version}";
patch = makeAppArmorPatch { inherit apparmor version; };
features.apparmor = true;
};
no_xsave =
{ name = "no-xsave";
patch = ./no-xsave.patch;

18
pkgs/top-level/all-packages.nix
View file

@ -7064,14 +7064,6 @@ let
kernelPatches = [];
};
linux_3_2_apparmor = lowPrio (linux_3_2.override {
kernelPatches = [ kernelPatches.apparmor_3_2 ];
extraConfig = ''
SECURITY_APPARMOR y
DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR y
'';
});
linux_3_2_xen = lowPrio (linux_3_2.override {
extraConfig = ''
XEN_DOM0 y
@ -7086,14 +7078,6 @@ let
];
};
linux_3_4_apparmor = lowPrio (linux_3_4.override {
kernelPatches = [ kernelPatches.apparmor_3_4 ];
extraConfig = ''
SECURITY_APPARMOR y
DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR y
'';
});
linux_3_6_rpi = makeOverridable (import ../os-specific/linux/kernel/linux-rpi-3.6.nix) {
inherit fetchurl stdenv perl buildLinux;
};
@ -7233,10 +7217,8 @@ let
# Build the kernel modules for the some of the kernels.
linuxPackages_3_2 = recurseIntoAttrs (linuxPackagesFor pkgs.linux_3_2 linuxPackages_3_2);
linuxPackages_3_2_apparmor = linuxPackagesFor pkgs.linux_3_2_apparmor linuxPackages_3_2_apparmor;
linuxPackages_3_2_xen = linuxPackagesFor pkgs.linux_3_2_xen linuxPackages_3_2_xen;
linuxPackages_3_4 = recurseIntoAttrs (linuxPackagesFor pkgs.linux_3_4 linuxPackages_3_4);
linuxPackages_3_4_apparmor = linuxPackagesFor pkgs.linux_3_4_apparmor linuxPackages_3_4_apparmor;
linuxPackages_3_6_rpi = linuxPackagesFor pkgs.linux_3_6_rpi linuxPackages_3_6_rpi;
linuxPackages_3_10 = recurseIntoAttrs (linuxPackagesFor pkgs.linux_3_10 linuxPackages_3_10);
linuxPackages_3_10_tuxonice = linuxPackagesFor pkgs.linux_3_10_tuxonice linuxPackages_3_10_tuxonice;