swendel/nixpkgs
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/SebastianWendel/nixpkgs.git synced 2024-09-20 04:19:00 +02:00
Code Issues Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

nixos/security/misc: expose SMT control option

Browse source 
For the hardened profile disable symmetric multi threading.  There seems to be
no *proven* method of exploiting cache sharing between threads on the same CPU
core, so this may be considered quite paranoid, considering the perf cost.
SMT can be controlled at runtime, however.  This is in keeping with OpenBSD
defaults.

TODO: since SMT is left to be controlled at runtime, changing the option
definition should take effect on system activation.  Write to
/sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/control
This commit is contained in:
Joachim Fasting 2018-12-26 22:24:04 +01:00
parent e9761fa327
commit ea4f371627
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG key ID: 5C204DF675C90294
2 changed files with 32 additions and 0 deletions
Show stats Download patch file Download diff file Expand all files Collapse all files

2
nixos/modules/profiles/hardened.nix
View file

@ -22,6 +22,8 @@ with lib;
security.protectKernelImage = mkDefault true;
security.allowSimultaneousMultithreading = mkDefault false;
security.virtualization.flushL1DataCache = mkDefault "always";
security.apparmor.enable = mkDefault true;

30
nixos/modules/security/misc.nix
View file

@ -31,12 +31,38 @@ with lib;
'';
};
security.allowSimultaneousMultithreading = mkOption {
type = types.bool;
default = true;
description = ''
Whether to allow SMT/hyperthreading. Disabling SMT means that only
physical CPU cores will be usable at runtime, potentially at
significant performance cost.
</para>
<para>
The primary motivation for disabling SMT is to mitigate the risk of
leaking data between threads running on the same CPU core (due to
e.g., shared caches). This attack vector is unproven.
</para>
<para>
Disabling SMT is a supplement to the L1 data cache flushing mitigation
(see <xref linkend="opt-security.virtualization.flushL1DataCache"/>)
versus malicious VM guests (SMT could "bring back" previously flushed
data).
</para>
<para>
'';
};
security.virtualization.flushL1DataCache = mkOption {
type = types.nullOr (types.enum [ "never" "cond" "always" ]);
default = null;
description = ''
Whether the hypervisor should flush the L1 data cache before
entering guests.
See also <xref linkend="opt-security.allowSimultaneousMultithreading"/>.
</para>
<para>
@ -88,6 +114,10 @@ with lib;
boot.kernel.sysctl."kernel.kexec_load_disabled" = mkDefault true;
})
(mkIf (!config.security.allowSimultaneousMultithreading) {
boot.kernelParams = [ "nosmt" ];
})
(mkIf (config.security.virtualization.flushL1DataCache != null) {
boot.kernelParams = [ "kvm-intel.vmentry_l1d_flush=${config.security.virtualization.flushL1DataCache}" ];
})